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Abstract (Summary) 
Marilyn Strathern has argued that "nature" in Euro-American culture has appeared as 
constraint; it has figured the givens of existence on which human artifice is seen to 
construct "society" or "culture."(5) Among those givens is the notion that human 
beings are naturally individuals. And blood, too, images individuality: "The very 
thought of blood, individual blood, touches the deepest feelings in man about life and 
death" ([RIchard Titmuss] 16.) Transfusion medicine, then, draws on a series of 
images with which Western culture is replete -- nature, society, the individual. But if 
it extends there images, transfusion medicine also refigures them. As Paul Rabinow 
has written," it is not quite true...that it is the `newness' of contemporary technology 
that leaves us culturally unprepared. It is also the effacement of the `oldness' of so 
many of the background assumptions and practices that lurk unexamined at the 
edges...."(6) Thus, if persons in the West are individuals, transfusion imagery also 
makes them "dividuals," of sorts; transfusion practices divide persons.(7) Our 
understanding of the splitting and splicing of persons in transfusion medicine draws 
on notions of interchangeable humanity and on notions of unique individuality. 
That Titmuss posed "altruistic gifts of life" against self-interested, "dangerous" market 
transactions is not surprising. What is interesting is a commonality with market 
formulations which Titmuss would ostensibly disavow. For the altruistic donor and 
the greedy "ooze for booze" seller have something in common: they both behave in an 
individualistic manner, though that may not be obvious on the part of the "donor." As 
Titmuss defines it, the concepts of "Altruism" and "donation" only make sense when 
the individual is conceptualized as discrete and separate from society. He writes: 
"There are no personal, predictable penalties for not giving, no socially enforced 
sanctions of remorse, shame or guilt" (74). No necessary moral relationship is entailed 
in the decision to donate, which then appears as a "choice" on the part of the donor. A 
pamphlet published by the American Association of Blood Banks reds: "In the usual 
circumstance, a donor will have no need to be n contact with the blood center...so that 
a direct relationship is not established."(16) The gift of blood flows not from moral or 
social obligations (relationships) but from goodwill and sentiments. Strathern notes 
that "Euro-American gift-giving really only works as a sing of personal commitment 
if it is also a sign of benign feeling" (Reproducing the Future 131). 
Blood, much as it once stood for human life, today can be seen to stand for profit. 
Several industrial democracies have seen political controversy surround blood 
institutions which, for commercial reasons, failed to protect unwitting recipients from 
HIV infection. "L'affaire du sang" in France, and similar scandals in Germany, Japan 
and the United States, have made visible the proprietary interests which lurk behind 
many gifts of life.(37) In extending a previous idea (blood is life) into a new domain 
(blood is an economic resource) the images examined here exemplify one strand of 
contemporary ideas about human life. "Artificial," "chosen," "preferred" -- human life 
is no longer a background assumption in human affairs, no longer the natural base on 
which society is constructed. As a zone of representation and intervention, blood and 
"life" are also zones of consumer choice.(38) In the late 1980s, articles began to 
appear in publications like Vogue, Seventeen, and Glamour, encouraging readers to 
preserve their own blood for future transfusions to avoid the danger represented by 
the anonymity of a community blood supply. "Autologous transfusion" was presented 
as having a certain cachet. Town and Country magazine wrote: "It's called autologous 
donation, and it's the safest form of transfusion. According to one source, the Pope 
does it, former President Reagan does it, Michael Jackson does it, and autologous 
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Blood / Money 
The first question that comes to the mind of anyone in connection with blood 
preservation is: Where does one get the blood? (Dr. Bernard Fantus, 1937) 
Giving blood is nothing compared to what else there is out there. There are so many 
people in need. It's like the lottery --people need the money. (Blood donor, 1992) 
One could hardly exhaust the meanings of blood. As Arlette Farge writes, "Voice le 
sand, indispensable fluide, champignon de l'aventure humaine dans toutes ses 
dimensions, physique, idaéologique et même spirituelle."(1) If blood has empodied 
multiple aspects of "the human adventure" -- from kinship and violence to nationality 
and race to life -- I want to draw attention to a general feature of these domains: 
relationship.(2) Used variously to exclude or restrict relationship (as in kinship and 
racial ideologies), blood has also been seen as that which is most human without 
respect to divisions: 
There is a bond that links all men and women in the world so closely and intimately 
that every difference of colour, religious belief and cultural heritage is insignificant 
beside it. Never varying in temperature more than five or six degrees, composed of 55 
percent water, the life stream of blood that runs in the veins of every member of the 
human race proves that the family of man is a reality.(3) 
"The family of man is a reality": it is a bodily reality. Humanity runs through the 
veins, and humanity takes the form of a family, of an initiate relatedness. Closely tied 
to blood's evocation of humanity is its evocation of "life:" 
Blood has always been associated with life and strength. Among primitive man's 
earliest experiences is the observation that life flows out of the body with the 
streaming of blood. We are told that even the apes stuff leaves and moss into bleeding 
wounds to stanch the flow and preserve life. How natural, therefore, to attempt to 
restore life and youth and strength by the administration of healthy blood.(4) 
This passage introduces a third domain. Blood is "humanity" and "life," and these are 
natural forms. Dr. L. M. Zimmerman wrote the passage in 1942 in an article on the 
emergence of blood transfusion as a medical practice. His reference to "nature" can be 
seen as a strategy for legitimizing a nascent institution -- transfusion medicine. Nature 
is imaged is two ways: first, in the physiology of the body itself, which is understood 
as a container for blood, itself understood as the substance of "life;" second, in the 
practice of preserving life by resealing skin, plugging up holes, maintaining the 
boundary of the body. Writing in the American Journal of Surgery, Dr. Zimmerman 
draws on the image of the bounded body to naturalize the "administration" of blood. 
The premise (transfusion is natural) is completed in Zimmerman's choice of a title: 
"The Evolution of Blood Banking." Perhaps transfusion was naturally selected. 
Marilyn Strathern has argued that "nature" in Euro-American culture has appeared as 
constraint; it has figured the givens of existence on which human artifice is seen to 
construct "society" or "culture."(5) Among those givens is the notion that human 
beings are naturally individuals. And blood, too, images individuality: "The very 
thought of blood, individual blood, touches the deepest feelings in man about life and 
death" (Titmuss 16.) Transfusion medicine, then, draws on a series of images with 
which Western culture is replete -- nature, society, the individual. But if it extends 
there images, transfusion medicine also refigures them. As Paul Rabinow has 
written," it is not quite true...that it is the `newness' of contemporary technology that 
leaves us culturally unprepared. It is also the effacement of the `oldness' of so many 
of the background assumptions and practices that lurk unexamined at the edges...."(6) 
Thus, if persons in the West are individuals, transfusion imagery also makes them 
"dividuals," of sorts; transfusion practices divide persons.(7) Our understanding of the 
splitting and splicing of persons in transfusion medicine draws on notions of 
interchangeable humanity and on notions of unique individuality. 
In contemporary Euro-American culture, technological innovations are challenging 
(and extending) old manners of thinking about persons and relationships and bodies.(8) 
One can make a long list of the proliferating mechanisms of transfusion medicine 
which divide bodies and persons to promote "life" -- plasmapherisis, phlebotomy, 
cytapherisis, hemagglutination, low-ionic polycation testing, hemapherisis, 
counterflow elutriation, whole blood donation. I hypothe-size that these processes 
provide a postmodern imagery for social relationships -- or the lack thereof. They 
highlight dissolution. While the fragmentation of the body in these biotechnological 
enterprises might have extended a previous imagery of partition -- for example, the 
modernist obsession with the wound -- current endeavors instead have displaced a 
previous imagery of wholeness:(9) The integrity of persons and bodies is called into 
question. Rabinow writes: 
The approach to "the body" found in contemporary biotechnology and genetics 
fragments it into a potentially discrete, knowable, and exploitable reservoir of 
molecular and biochemical products and events. By reason of its commitment to 
fragmentation, there is literally no conception of the person as a whole underlying 
these particular technological practices. ("Severing the Ties" 186)(10) 
In the imagery disclosed by transfusion medicine, persons appear both singular 
(bounded) and general (Substitutable, transfusable) -- at once unitary and fragmented. 
Singularity and generality are given form in the practices and images of blood 
procurement, some of which I try to capture in this essay. Red Cross campaigns 
designed to elicit compassion and generosity, health interviews at the site of donation, 
testing of blood for possible contaminants, bureaucratic practices of tracking and 
recording donations -- all in one way or another contain assumptions about what 
constitutes a person or individual. This paper investigates one mode of procurement, 
the paradoxical"gift of life."(11) My analysis pertains exclusively to blood 
procurement systems which rely on free gifts to anonymous others -- systems like the 
ones administered by the Red Cross. I exclude discussion of the reception of 
transfusion at my own peril; but for purposes of this essay, I choose to highlight only 
the social ramifications of donation per se. Donation is an institution in its own right -
- talking to donors and administrators may or may not involve talking about who 
actually receives a transfusion. Indeed, the abstraction of gifts of blood between 
specific persons into gifts of blood from "individuals" to "society," a figuration of 
donation analyzed in this paper, would seem to indicate that, for many, excately 
where the blood ends up is a moot point. 
Both gift and commodity, unique and common, individual and social, the "gift of life" 
straddles domains normally held distinct: the intimacy of bodily relationship and the 
anonymity of market transaction. The paradox is made evident in a startling analogy 
for the exchangeability of blood: money. As we will se, "money" has been one image 
associated with blood donation virtually from its inception. 
Giving Blood 
When you donate blood at a blood mobile, the atmosphere is convivial and amiable. 
People staffing the site wear festive paraphenalia, like a button picturing Dracula with 
the words "I'm hungry for your blood." One donor might wear a gold plated drop with 
a Red Cross on its that says "One Gallon Donor," equaling eight donations at one pint 
each. You are greeted at the entry to the donation center by a large banner: "Give 
another chance. Give blood." You might also encounter a large red stop sign that 
reads: "STOP. Stop and think. Healthy Donors are the Cornerstone of a Safe Blood 
Supply. Are you eligible to donate blood? If you're not sure, take and read the 
information." Below that, a small box with cards. Rules for eligibility; information on 
anonymous HIV testing. 
Upon entering the room where the actual donation takes place, you are given an 
"American Red Cross Blood Donation Record." A senior citizen or two might staff a 
table where you fill out the information on this form. They assign you to a nurse who 
conducts a health interview. The interview is called a "health check." Information on 
the Blood Donation Record is reviewed and your finger is pricked. The blood is tested 
instantly for iron to identify possible anemia. You are issued a card that identifies 
your blood type, and how many times you have given blood. First-time donors receive 
the card in the mail two to four weeks after donation. After screening, you are 
assigned a blood pack. You next wait for the "phlebomotmist" to conduct the actual 
draining of blood out of your body. You lie down, perhaps in a reclining lawn-chair 
types seat, in preparation for the drawing of blood. 
A phlebotomist confirms your ID before proceeding with the donation by checking 
your ID number and that indicated on the blood pack. The phlebotomist, who 
probably wears a red tag with a name and a "Donor Services" logo, gives a red ball-
ring to you. You are told to squeeze on it every four seconds during the donation. The 
phlebotomist may say to you: "I have to check both arms for tracks. We're checking 
arms to make sure illicit drugs have not been used intraveinously." A vein suitable for 
drawing blood is located and marked with a pen. The blood pack is put next to your 
on a small apparatus. Around you, other donors, and their blood, are visible at various 
stages of the donation process. 
Your arm is disinfected with an "iodine solution, which destroys all the surface 
bacteria; this kills gangrene, bacteria, and other germs," your phlebotomist tells you as 
your arm is cleaned. The phlebotomist is wearing blue gloves, vivid against the bright 
yellow stain of disinfectant. YOu might be told a story while this happens, perhaps a 
story about "some lawyer back East" who got a paper cut, did not wash it immediately. 
He left the city for the weekend, and got very ill at his cabin, running a 105 degree 
temperature. By the end of the weekend, he was taken to a hospital emergency room. 
He "lost" part of his nose and his fingers. "It was a type of virulent bacteria," you 
might be told. 
You might subsequently notice that everything around you is plastic -- wrapped in 
plastic, made of plastic, handled with plastic gloves. There are several trash baskets 
around the room with special florescent orange "biohazard" bags bearing the 
"biohazard" icon. The colors marking the scene -- yellows, oranges, the red of blood -
- alert your attention to the dangers of infection.(12) 
The phlebotomist inserts the needle connected by a clear tube to the blood pact. "It 
should sting." The needle is silver metal, presumably stainless steel. You watch as 
your red blood snakes through the plastic tube and begins to fill up the blood pack. 
The initial sting "feels just like an itch." 
You are told," After you give blood, you should drink an extra four glasses of non-
alcoholic liquids. Use caution if you plan to do anything that could put others at risk. 
For the next five hours, keep the bandage on, don't do any heavy work. If you get 
dizzy, lie down. If the needle site starts to bleed, raise your arm straight up and press 
on the site until the bleeding stops." The needle is withdrawn. You are handed a small 
card that says: "Post Donation Call Back. Call 503-280-0203 (collect), if you feel 
your blood should NOT be transfused to another person. The information you provide 
will be kept confidential." 
The phlebotomist cuts off the flow of the blood by pressing on your arm. After 
donation, seventeen different tests are conducted on each unit of blood, you are told. 
Handling your blood pack, the phlebotomist might comment: "It's amazing that the 
human body can deliver that volume from that tiny spot. You did superb." Finally, 
you are directed by a volunteer to the rest and relaxation area where you might have 
some juice and cookies. 
When asked to interpret this experience, or to describe their motivations for donating 
blood, most donors are unreflective and have little to say about a self-evidently 
admirable act of altruism. For example, one donor said to me that he gives blood 
"...because people need it. Because of the warm, fuzzy feeling it gives me." Another 
said: "If someone's been hurt they need to blood. You used to get persuaded to give 
blood by making a direct connection with someone you know." Drawing on an 
analogy, another said: "Giving blood is nothing compared to what else there is out 
there. There are so many people in need. It's like the lottery -- people need the 
money." 
The blood professionals at donation sites have more to say. One registered nurse who 
screens health histories told me, "we want the donor to be healthy, to tolerate donation. 
Usually information is readily given. But you can never tell if they're lying." When 
asked to describe motivations for donating blood, she said, "It makes people feel like 
they're doing a service to the community. Everyone wants to do something, but they 
don't have the time to do it. It's a fast way of doing community service. It's 
anonymous. You're giving of yourself, but no one knows who you really are." 
Gift and Commodity 
In 1971, RIchard Titmuss, a British sociologist, published a scathing critique of the 
U.S. blood procurement system, The Gift Relationship. The book was the subject of a 
great deal of controversy.(13) A comparative study of Britain and the U.S., The Gift 
Relationship argued that the over-commercialization f U.S. culture, epitomized by the 
selling of blood or "life," represented a manifest danger to the public health. 
Commercial blood banking, Titmuss claimed, attracted the very worst segments of 
society to blood collection centers: "ooze for booze" donors, coaxed to lie about their 
health status to make money for drugs or alcohol. Titmuss argued that 
commercialized blood procurement enticed low-income persons to contribute, but 
drove away middle- and upper-class persons. 
[T]he trend appears to be markedly in the direction of the increasing 
commercialization of blood and donor relationships. Concomitantly, we find that 
proportionately more blood is being supplied by the poor, the unskilled, the 
unemployed, Negroes and other low income groups and, with the rise of 
plasmapherisis, a new class is emerging of an exploited human population of high 
blood yielders. (119) 
Certain areas of social life should be restricted from commercial intrusion, Titmuss 
felt, particularly those concerned with the maintenance of human life. He thus 
advocated a moral economy,(14) whereby certain kinds of things and services would 
be held beyond market transactions. And since Titmuss first published these 
arguments in the late 60s and early 70s, the U.S. blood system has overwhelmingly 
moved toward the kind of gift model that Titmuss advocated.(15) 
That Titmuss posed "altruistic gifts of life" against self-interested, "dangerous" market 
transactions is not surprising. What is interesting is a commonality with market 
formulations which Titmuss would ostensibly disavow. For the altruistic donor and 
the greedy "ooze for booze" seller have something in common: they both behave in an 
individualistic manner, though that may not be obvious on the part of the "donor." As 
Titmuss defines it, the concepts of "Altruism" and "donation" only make sense when 
the individual is conceptualized as discrete and separate from society. He writes: 
"There are no personal, predictable penalties for not giving, no socially enforced 
sanctions of remorse, shame or guilt" (74). No necessary moral relationship is entailed 
in the decision to donate, which then appears as a "choice" on the part of the donor. A 
pamphlet published by the American Association of Blood Banks reds: "In the usual 
circumstance, a donor will have no need to be n contact with the blood center...so that 
a direct relationship is not established."(16) The gift of blood flows not from moral or 
social obligations (relationships) but from goodwill and sentiments. Strathern notes 
that "Euro-American gift-giving really only works as a sing of personal commitment 
if it is also a sign of benign feeling" (Reproducing the Future 131). 
Donors would appear to agree. They will say that they donate for the good of society, 
for the sake of the community, and because it makes them feel good to do so.(17) The 
Red Cross, for its part, works to elicit these emotions: the Gallon Pin is worn with 
pride. Goodwill, in Euro-American thinking, does not necessarily entail a personal 
relationship. Instead, donors draw on an image of society as an undifferentiated, 
anonymous entity, and they pose themselves against it. They say that giving blood is 
good for "the community." Donors conceptualize the goodness of donation as self-
evident; it is goodness born of sociable feelings flowing outward from the person to 
"society." Strathern writes: 
Donation...may simply involve an act of bodily emission intended for an anonymous 
recipient; on the other hand it may involve a relationship between donors and 
recipients as partners in a single enterprise. This corresponds to the double 
conceptualization of sociality in consumer culture, as much a matter or an individual's 
relationship to society in the abstract as of interaction between concrete persons. 
(Reproducing the Future 130) 
Anthropological theories of the gift have been helpful here. Indeed, Titmuss drew 
inspiration from Marcel Mauss's famous essay on the gift.(18) Mauss argues that 
"archaic" gift-exchange works to solidify social relationships and inscribe moral 
obligation because in many non-Western societies a gift carries the identity of its 
giver. A product embodies its maker so that upon exchange, the thing (or person) in 
question does not appear as a free-standing "object" in the eyes of subjects, it is 
instead constitutive of a social relationship, it is "personified."(19) No commodity 
fetishism here: the "archaic" gift draws attention to its source of production and to its 
manner of transaction -- it symbolizes relationships. the fact that the gift contains the 
giver bonds the recipient within a relationship and a return gift is compelled. Jonathan 
Parry writes, "The gift contains some part of the spiritual essence of the donor, and 
this constrains the recipient to make a return."(20) 
Gift economies do not differentiate "society" from "the market," or social relations 
from economic ones.(21) In contrast, Euro-American ideas about disinterested "free 
gifts" are only meaningful in a social system that cordons off a domain of purely self-
interested social action -- the market. Parry writes: 
The ideology of a disinterested gift emerges in parallel with an ideology of a purely 
interested exchange...Those who make free and unconstrained contracts in the market 
also make free and unconstrained gifts outside it. But these gifts are defined as what 
market relations are not -- altruistic, moral and loaded with emotion. (458,456) 
This is what Strathern has highlighted in her analysis of the "altruism" of donations of 
bodily materials. "Altruism" is seen through analogy with commodity exchange. The 
"pure gift" or "donation" of bodily material (e.g., blood) shares the same premises as 
self-interested market transactions -- the autonomy of individuals and the separation 
of things from persons (relations). 
Thus, Titmuss misappropriated Maussian ideas about gift-exchange to analyze what is 
in fact a different sort of transaction-altruistic donation. What distinguishes "modern 
donations" from "archaic gifts" is not just their opposition to self-interested market 
transactions (since gift-exchange will not admit a distinction between self-interest and 
moral obligation or between society and economy), but also their alienability. 
Donations are divorcable from the person who makes them -- this is the meaning of 
altruism, of a self-less gift to others. And this is a commodity formulation: things in 
exchange are alienable (separate) from the transactors. It is also the enabling premise 
of body part procurement for a general social supply. Strathern writes: 
"Gifts" (presents) are free-standing entities just like commodities.... Indeed the person 
who purchases a present to give to a friend simply puts in reverse the same process 
which makes it possible for him/her to donate body substance to a blood bank, 
cadaver to science. An anonymously produced object becomes part of a store on 
which others draw. (Reproducing the Future 130) 
Strathern here draws a continuity not between the "archaic gift" and the modern 
"present," but between the present and the commodity. Her context is her work on 
Melanesian gift exchange.(22) If by giving gifts Euro-Americans create relationships, 
then the Melanesian premise is that the relationships are already there, they just need 
to be made visible or to be elicited.(23) Sociality -- connectedness -- is a background 
assumption in "gift economies." By contrast, in the individualistic, market-oriented 
West, persons act purposively to make "society" -- they may act kindly to make 
society civil.(24) If social relations are a focus of people's practices, then the form 
which those relations take (individual + society) reflects a cultural premise: the 
ontological separation of the person from society or social relations.(25) 
Beyond the basic issue of reciprocity -- injunctions to give, receive, and return -- the 
question of altruism thus turns on notions of personhood and the cultural form which 
relations between persons and things take. In his genealogy of modern Western 
individualism, Louis Dumont locates the origin of modern ideas about property in 
modern ideas about personhood (i.e., that persons are individuals). John Locke's 
theories of the origin of property in labor give Dumont a starting point. To base 
property in labor, according to Dumont, is to derive a title to external things from 
what most evidently belongs to the individual, his body and effort. It "...is equivalent 
to deriving a juridical relation between man and things not from the necessities of the 
social order, but from an intrinsic property of man as an individual" (52). Dumont 
sees this idea as connected to later formulations of the social contract, which put 
individuals as logically prior to society. Ideas about donation echo Dumont's account 
of emerging individualism: "to be independent, not to be included in anyone, and to 
be guaranteed against the attacks or encroachments of anyone, is to be able to dispose 
of oneself without interference from the outside, that is to say, indifferently, to be free 
or to be the proprietor of oneself, body, labor, and all" (53). And no one is forced to 
donate blood, there are no obligations to donate, one may "dispose of oneself without 
interference from the outside."(26) 
Of course, the gift of blood raises special problems. The alienability of things is one 
thing, the alienability of the body quite another. For if what is exchanged in 
transfusion is ostensibly a person -- blood or body -- then what can be said of the 
integrity of the "individual" in the first place? The identity of donor and blood does 
not surprise; what does surprise is their disconnection. 
"Blood banking": the Singular (personal) and the General (anonymous) 
Transfusion medicine captures the social anonymity of "donations" through an 
analogy with money.(27) The analogy readily presented itself to Dr. Bernard Fantus 
when he opened the world's first blood collection center in Chicago in 1937. 
Traditionally, blood had been transfused directly from donor to recipient. Anti-
coagulation technologies developed between 1914 and 1916 enabled the storage of 
blood for periods of time.(28) Donors could give blood which would later be 
transfused into other persons. Dr. Fantus called his new center, located in the Cook 
County Hospital, a "blood bank." Blood, it seems, was like money. It could be saved 
and spent; intake and outflow could be matched. The blood bank became a depository 
for individual "savings accounts": "Just as one cannot draw money from a bank unless 
one has deposited some, so the blood preservation department cannot supply blood 
unless as much comes in as goes out. The term `blood bank' is not a mere 
metaphor."(29) Since one could not withdraw without depositing, individual deposits 
were tracked to maintain a record of credits and debits: "The blood will be drawn into 
the flask in the usual manner and taken immediately to the Solutions Laboratory. The 
date, the name of the donor, his address, his color, the name of the intern and his 
service should accompany the flask" (Fantus 129).(30) 
Here, blood had to be individualized in order to keep a quantitative record -- blood 
does not present itself as singular, it has to be made singular. If money is a 
generalized measure of value, then identity is attached to it rather than carried by 
it.(31) This is a relation of ownership. The analogy with blood is evident: blood itself 
does not carry identity, much less relationship. Neither the body nor the person nor 
money is seen integrally to imply relations. This allows ideas about blood to include 
the notion that it is a generic substance, simply human. 
This generality of blood exemplifies an attitude toward the body widely shared in 
Euro-American culture: the body is potentially alienable. In this configuration of ideas, 
bodies and persons are somehow discrete. A dualism of body and mind appears, an 
ideational separation common in Euro-American medicine and biotechnology.(32) 
Contemporary blood banks, as much as contemporary commercial plasma centers, 
trade on this dualism. The relationship between person and body is one of ownership; 
what one owns one might sell -- or donate. However, if Euro-Americans think of 
themselves as individuals, they also think of themselves as self-alienable: one may 
partition oneself for an other, regardless of whether or not a relationship with that 
other pertains. "It's anonymous. You're giving of yourself, but no one knows who you 
really are," one nurse told me. 
However, imaginary relationships are created. As much as I have tried to emphasize 
the "anonymity" of donation, one might easily draw attention to the multiple ways in 
which the "gift of life" is thought to personalize the donor. Blood may in fact be 
singularized under the identity of the donor: this is how blood banks track deposits, 
and how one individual can imagine him or herself saving the life of another 
individual. One donor said, "I donate blood because I have AB type. My plasma is 
universal. Having worked in a hospital, seeing people turn around from dying inspires 
you." Red Cross promotional materials create these "fictitious" connections. On a 
sign-up sheet for use at donation sites, a small, blonde girl tells the prospective donor: 
"Thank you, you saved my life." Titmuss and others have tried to contrast this sort of 
donation with impersonal commercial relationships.(33) 
But commodification (commercialization) itself does not necessarily entail anonymity. 
Conversely, in its gift form blood may be thought of anonymously. There is thus a 
contradiction in the commodification of blood: making blood a commodity does not 
in fact make it generic. This is in part an effect of the complexity of blood banking as 
an institution. Whether or not donors think they are making a free gift to society, the 
Red Cross (and other blood banking organizations) eventually recover the costs 
incurred in procuring blood by charging hospitals (who charge patients) a price for 
blood. But even in commodifying it, the Red Cross does not thereby make it 
anonymous. The blood is marked with the donor's identity so that it may be traced 
back to the original donor should a problem occur in transfusion. This technique is a 
result of the HIV epidemic; it was developed in the mid-1980s. Screening for HIV 
defines a community of humans who are interchangeable by excluding certain persons 
(those deemed "at risk") from donating. Singularizing blood-packs individuates body, 
even as it is transfused into another's body, as a means for protecting (and defining) 
the community. 
Hence, singularization serves both commodification and altruistic donation. The 
singularity of blood is called on as a device for protection, as an apparatus of 
purification. The community blood bank singularizes blood to insure traceability and 
the prevention of further infestation. Individuals singularize blood also as a means of 
protecting themselves from other individuals, of gaining retribution for a wrong 
committed by the community (as when it is negligent in purifying the blood supply), 
or to imagine connecting to another individual.There may be a further complication 
here. I have argued that altruistic donation does not entail lasting social relationships. 
But "reciprocity" -- the obligation to return a gift -- may in fact be present in blood 
donations. When asked, donors repeatedly say that they are giving something "back to 
the community." Thus, they are already in a state of obligation as members of society. 
Reciprocity here takes the form of interaction between an individual and "the 
community" (society) understood in the abstract. The mode of giving back suggests 
that what is originally given by the community is life itself.(34) The community as a 
whole is imagined as the progenitor of life, and it is the community which thereby 
binds its members in a state of obligation. This may explain the "naturalness" (nature, 
again) of the inclination to donate blood recorded by social scientists. 
For donors who see blood donation as a natural and obvious activity where the value 
of the gift exceeds the costs of any discomfort associated with it, the pursuit of more 
detailed reasons for blood donation may be without meaning. 
All our own experiences lead us to believe that participation in the whole-blood 
supply is the natural, unforced response of a great many people once they are exposed 
to a mild degree of personal solicitation and some convenient donation opportunities. 
(Drake et al. 97, 99) 
But what then does one make of the fact that no person is obligated to give blood -- 
neither legally nor socially? The act of donation makes social connection (individual 
+ society) voluntary since not every person donates, and not every person feels 
obligated to donate, far from it. It is thus a matter of choice to identify with the 
community as a whole, if not humanity. For are those who donate "more" human? Are 
those who are prohibited from donating (e.g., gay men and IV drug users) "less"? 
Who gets to choose to contribute?(35) "Choice," finally, is the proper idiom of 
sociality in a consumer culture composed of individuals, where life itself may be a 
matter of choice.(36) 
Blood / Money 
Blood, much as it once stood for human life, today can be seen to stand for profit. 
Several industrial democracies have seen political controversy surround blood 
institutions which, for commercial reasons, failed to protect unwitting recipients from 
HIV infection. "L'affaire du sang" in France, and similar scandals in Germany, Japan 
and the United States, have made visible the proprietary interests which lurk behind 
many gifts of life.(37) In extending a previous idea (blood is life) into a new domain 
(blood is an economic resource) the images examined here exemplify one strand of 
contemporary ideas about human life. "Artificial," "chosen," "preferred" -- human life 
is no longer a background assumption in human affairs, no longer the natural base on 
which society is constructed. As a zone of representation and intervention, blood and 
"life" are also zones of consumer choice.(38) In the late 1980s, articles began to 
appear in publications like Vogue, Seventeen, and Glamour, encouraging readers to 
preserve their own blood for future transfusions to avoid the danger represented by 
the anonymity of a community blood supply. "Autologous transfusion" was presented 
as having a certain cachet. Town and Country magazine wrote: "It's called autologous 
donation, and it's the safest form of transfusion. According to one source, the Pope 
does it, former President Reagan does it, Michael Jackson does it, and autologous 
donation may soon be the latest mark of medical sophistication."(39) 
In a world of sophisticated medicine, one might imagine the gift of blood to be a last 
vestige of human goodwill and social solidarity. Blood banking might be seen to 
ameliorate the ills of a society that is too differentiated, too atomized, lacking 
common feeling. But if the gift of life evokes common feeling, it also reinscribes the 
premises of commodity culture. Like commodities, persons who give blood are seen 
as free-standing, discrete; they do not imply relationships within them. When giving 
or receiving blood is conceptualized on the model of winning the lottery (as in the 
epigraph of this essay), what is being thought about the moral commitment of persons 
to each other? All of the notional investment of blood banking with "humanity" and a 
"natural" inclination to give only highlights what is lacking: anonymous donations do 
not create social relations. 
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